Friday, March 30, 2012

Is there a compromise between the generalized and concrete other?

In Benhabib's "The Generalized and Concrete Other," the idea of the generalized other and the concrete other are introduced and set in opposition to each other. The generalized other is an idea that states that everyone, as a general being in relation to all others, is entitled to certain rights and privileges as a human being.
The generalized other does have its uses, such as in law or any other situation where a universal doctrine is needed, where the general has to be appealed to, but in any other situation, the generalized other has major shortcomings. First and foremost, it fails to acknowledge humans as true individuals but rather as the same individual in a multitude of instances.
The concrete other, on the other hand, is the idea that in each situation one should see the other person as an individual with a "concrete history identity, and affective-emotional constitution." This is more advantageous in particular situations and in personal relationships, where a deeper level of caring and emotion is involved than in any universal situation.
The problem that arises is the conflict of interest between the two, and whether or not it is possible to have a compromise between the generalized and concrete in order to create a fair, yet universally applicable approach to others as rational beings. Is it possible for these two ideas to coexist? If this was even possible, would it be practical to approach things for this mixed standpoint? Furthermore, it seems like it would not be possible to mix these two ideas perfectly in practice, so how would you go about privileging one mode of seeing the other over another?
It seems like it would be impossible to reach a mean between these two others, or how to implement one. What do you think would be the right way to implement a mixture of the two that would not privilege one or the other?

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